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BOOK REVIEWS
BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

Foms. By Louis R. Frumer.

Albany: Matthew Bender & Company, 1951-53, 4 Vols.
(1 to follow), $85.00.
At the time of their adoption in 1938, great things were expected
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On the whole, those expectations appear to have been justified. Of course, this statement can
only be made if the underlying philosophy of the rules is accepted;
that is, that procedural technicalities and trial tactics calculated to
give one party an advantage over the other in the presentation of
its case serve no useful purpose, and that the prime objective of
any litigation is to bring as much information as possible out into
the open where the trier of fact can pass upon it uninfluenced insofar
as possible by the personal abilities of the advocates of the various
parties. The purpose of the rules seems to be that if there is to be a
race, at least everyone should start even.
A good argument can be made against this concept. Some claim
that under the rules trials are largely deprived of their character
of adversary proceedings, and are more in the nature of an arbitration. In fact, after indulgence in all of the preliminary motions,
discovery procedures,, interrogatories and motions to produce documents, pre-trial conferences and other innovations designed to eliminate completely the element of surprise, the actual trial itself often
comes as an anticlimax. I do not know whether as a matter of
statistics the adoption of the rules has resulted in a reduction in the
number of jury trials, but I would suspect that it has; for after your
opponent has rummaged through your files at his leisure, frequently
there is little left with which to impress a jury. I would be even
more certain that the number of settlements has materially increased;
and in fact, if you postulate the perfect attorney who, knowing the
strengths and weaknesses of his own case and having access to all
available information regarding those of his opponents, can make
an accurate estimate of the outcome, there is no reason why virtually
every case should not be settled before trial. In view of this, the
ancient adage that the best way to ascertain the truth is not by
impartial investigation but by admittedly partisan presentation of
the two sides of the question before an impartial tribunal, once
considered basic to our system of the administration of justice, seems
to have lost its validity, and lawyers, judges and juries, no doubt
to their consternation, find themselves aligned together in a sort of
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search for truth in the Sherlock'Holmes manner. No wonder some
of the older practitioners have disdained these new fangled ideas
and retired to the state courts where at least a semblance of the old
regime is retained.
And all of this has been done in the name of simplification. "To
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" is the avowed purpose of the rules. Justice we may assume,
subject to the limitations already noted. But speedy and inexpensive?
At least this is open to question. A conscienceless defendant with unlimited resources can, by utilizing all of the pre-trial procedures
open to him, prevent an-adjudication upon the merits for an almost
indefinite period; and it is a recognized fact that litigation in the
federal courts has become so expensive as to be the wealthy plaintiff's prerogative rather than the poor plaintiff's right. The misuse
of the powers conferred by the rules gives rise to such uncontrolled
(and, I may add on behalf of the vast majority of the bar, unmerited)
outbursts as that of Mr. Westbrook Pegler, who once wrote for national syndication:
"I refer to the practice known as the examination before trial, which...
is a weapon for blackmail, blackguarding, harassment and intimidation
and is wantonly abused every court day of the year."
Mr. Pegler's remarks are, of course, inspired by a thoroughly unjustified assumption that where the possibility of abuse is present
the fact of abuse must exist. On the contrary, if most attorneys were
not honest and conscientious, the profession would have fallen into
disrepute long ago; and despite the relatively large number of pointless jokes about lawyers based on a contrary premise, on the whole
the bar is accepted as being composed of honorable men. This being
the case, the purpose for which its members utilize the Federal rules is
not to slip one over on their opponents, but to attain justice; and
the purposes and objectives of the rules being equally available to
both sides, if used for that purpose they promote rather than discourage that end. So we have come full circle and arrived again at
an adversary proceeding, but one conducted in a different manner.
In other words, the same old game played according to new rules.
The difficulty here of course is that if your opponent knows the
rules and you don't, you're going to get the worst of it. And this
is why many lawyers stay out of federal court. Having learned certain
practices and procedures in law school, a mental inertia sets in after
graduation which prevents them from adapting themselves to changing conditions. The Federal Rules, being designed as a dynamic
rather than a static approach to the problem, have been frequently
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amended; being relatively recent in concept, they are still subject
to constant interpretation and re-interpretation; and being in the
nature of a radical approach, they cut across the lines carefully drawn
by many a law school professor in procedure courses where the
lecturer's notes have been handed down from generation to generation. Consequently the mentally lazy steer clear of them, and prefer
the mechanical repetition of the hallowed practices of the state courts,
where tradition reigns supreme and the Clerk can always tell you
where to file your paper. These unadventurous spirits must look upon
those who practice in the federal courts somewhat as the uninitiate
regarded the alchemists of old; mysterious beings who by following
secret processes could achieve results otherwise unobtainable.
My copy of the Federal Rules, complete with index and forms,
contains one hundred and forty pages. It is written in relatively lucid
English. One reading can dispel most of these mysteries and gain
the reader entrance to the exalted land of federal practice. And yet
it is amazing how often this simple solution is ignored.
So that there could be no misconstruction of their meaning, the
authors of the rules appended some twenty-nine forms to them. Presumably they considered these sufficient to meet any contingency
which might arise. Mr. Frumer has now enlarged this number to
1517, with one more volume of his formulary yet to come. The
disparity between these two figures is somewhat overwhelming,
and the reason for it is not entirely obvious. But perhaps Mr. Frumer
gives a hint of it when he writes in his introduction:
"These forms are not designed merely to enable the draftsman to 'get
by' and to avoid procedural calamities. Obviously it would be absurd if
they did not serve that purpose. Equally or perhaps even more important,

these forms are designed to enable the practitioner to cooperate fullyin action-with all the objectives of the rules and to assist in the work
of making the rules serve (as all procedure should) as the handmaiden
of justice'."
This, then, is the philosopher's stone; the "open sesame" to the
mysterious realm of federal practice. And it is all simplified to the
state where the veriest neophyte can pronounce the magic incantation
and cast the spell. Here are no eighteen forms of complaints (as in
the appendix to the rules) but 258, including specific jurisdictional
allegations under all of the major federal acts and concrete examples
of complaints in various types of actions involving subjects from
accounting through warranty. Discovery procedures give rise to 240
forms, and judgments almost a hundred. And, not content with
the fertile field afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Mr. Frumer adds half a hundred extra forms for use in the Court
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of Claims and forty for the United States Tax Court. No doubt many
situations can and will arise for which no form is provided; but
making due allowance for the limitations of human foresight, it is
difficult to see how the collection could be more complete.
But those volumes are more than a mere collection of models to be
slavishly imitated. Mr. Frumer's notes and textual material form a
commentary upon the rules themselves and upon the forms provided
which should make their adaption to any given situation a simple
matter for anyone with even the minimum imagination. In fact, with
Mr. Frumer's four volumes (and a future fifth) as a guide through
the jungle of federal procedures, it is difficult to see how anyone
could lose his way. Perhaps with help like this to a future generation
of lawyers the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and practice under
them will no longer seem like a tight rope stretched over a chasm,
where it is necessary to exercise extreme caution in order to preserve
a precarious balance and where only the foolhardy ever venture at
all, but will be a broad highway leading to the attainment of justice,
along which all can travel with the minimum of difficulty and without
dangers inherent in the pitfalls of outmoded technical requirements
and procedural difficulties.
Walter P. Armstrong, Jr.*

PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY,

By Merton Ferson. Brooklyn: The Foundation
Press, 1954. Pp. xx, 490.

Good elementary textbooks on standard curriculum subjects are
rare, but this is one of them. It has all the qualities which a book
designed for the use of the uninitiated should have. It is first and
foremost clear. There can be no mistaking the author's meaning.
Secondly, it is easy to read. The style is crisp and decisive, reflecting
certitude of information and judgment. Thirdly, it evidences great
good common sense in being of a proper length even in the development of the most difficult topics. Elementary notions must be explained in sufficient fullness for completeness and accuracy, but yet
with sufficient brevity to avoid losing sight of the central theme in
a mass of details. Elaboration is for treatises and not for textbooks.
Fourthly, there is no attempt to make the textbook double as an
index-search book. The discussion and citation of authorities are
such as to exemplify and illustrate the author's account, but no
greater. Lastly, and most importantly, it is a systematic and a critical
exposition of the foundations of the subject. It is not a mere collection
* Member of the firm of Armstrong, McCadden, Allen, Braden & Goodman,
Memphis, Tennessee.
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of so many sentences as will bear footnotes. The underlying principles and rules are sought out, explained, and appraised so that
the text emerges as a reasoned statement and not opinion. No more
should be asked of a textbook.
Dean Ferson adheres to the traditional content of agency, treating
of both master and servant and principal and agent. But he gives
by far the most emphasis to the "central problems" of agency, "how
and why a master is affected by the acts of his servant; and how
and why a principal is affected by the acts of his agents" (p. vi). The
other "incidental problems" of the rights and obligations between the
agent and the principal and the agent and the third party are given
must less space, only twenty-four out of four hundred and nineteen
pages. This he does because quite correctly he regards these aspects
of the subject as no more than applications of elementary principles
of contracts and torts (p. vi). On the other hand, the subject of
representations and warranties by an "agent" is developed in considerable detail to demonstrate that it forms part of the law of master
and servant, not of that of principal and agent.
The book should prove of special value in schools which have
abandoned teaching agency as, a separate course or which have
reduced the hours of instruction devoted to it below the traditional
number. A student of normal intelligence and industry should be
able to acquire an adequate understanding of the elements of agency
from a reading of the book without ever hearing a lecture. This
being so, a lecturer with limited time very properly can concentrate
on those topics which are of particular interest, difficulty, or importance and expect his students to get the rest on their own. In
this way the book will be of very special utility to me, for the Louisiana legislation on agency is sufficiently different from the general
Anglo-American law to require detailed separate presentation, and
the Anglo-American law must be taught as well and compared and
contrasted with it. Though few teachers of agency have my problem,
many are faced with insufficient time to develop the subject as they
would wish. They should find Dean Ferson's book a means of obtaining
relief without prejudicing their students.
Besides, I should think that most good students would welcome a
course which assumes their capacity to learn its less difficult aspects
without classroom exercises. We might discover that law professors
can impart much more to their students in the long run by concentrating their own attention on phases of a subject not adequately
treated in good texts. I myself annually find it necessary to devote
considerable time to the repreparation of lectures if I am to be
effective. Yet the time so spent on essentials is largely lost so far
as increasing my understanding of them is concerned, and it reduces
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the opportunity I have for advancing in knowledge of other phases
of the subject. I cannot but believe that both we and our students
would be better off if we could do otherwise.
ROBERT
*

Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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An Extra Measure Of
Service
Since its earliest days, Shepard's Citations has been
known for the care exercised in every detail of its construction.
And because craftsmen, devoted to an ideal of perfection, hand-build the citations of today just as they have
hand-built them for 80 years, Shepard's Citations continues to be one of the most respected and envied in
the field of fine law books.
Long ago we learned that nothing less than patient,
skillful and painstaking methods could produce the service which good lawyers required. Perhaps it is true that
we build better than a law book need be.
But in the pleasure, safety, prestige and satisfaction
which every Shepard owner enjoys, we find the justification that this extra measure of service requires.
Tens of thousands of lawyers fell us you cannot afford
to maintain a law practice without constant reliance upon Shepard's Citations.
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